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lages themselves is rather insignificant, even though the party does claim some members in the local area. For example, many of the mainlanders who work in the area in some official capacity are Kuomintang members. Taiwanese involved in *hsiang* and *hsien* politics often belong to the party. In addition, some better educated Taiwanese who hold local civil service jobs in the Public Office or in the school system are members. There are even a few ordinary and uneducated village men who have been drawn into party membership, possibly from ambition. Thus, the village storekeeper and the twenty-one-year-old son of one of the poorer families of the village are party members. As far as can be determined, though, these men play an insignificant and relatively inactive part even in local party affairs. A perhaps typical attitude toward membership in the Kuomintang was "such things are not for honest working people."

VILLAGE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

Hsin Hsing village itself has several elected officials which include a mayor, a village representative to the *hsiang* council, and the heads of each of the seven *lin* into which the village is divided. Of these offices, those of the mayor and the village representative are most important, since these individuals actually have a formal function within the village as well as in its outside relations. The mayor organizes and conducts the village meetings which are usually held once every two months, organizes the village for its annual work session on local public projects, and stands as the direct intermediary between the village and the police and local government. In a lesser way, the village representative who meets regularly with the district council serves the important function of maintaining the village's relationship with the other villages of the *hsiang* and with the *hsiang* officials.

The role of the *lin chang* (neighborhood chief) is relatively simple: he aids the mayor and village representative in communicating with the villagers. He summons the people to village meetings, work sessions, and any other official functions which require the participation of the whole village or a specific part of it. (Nonofficial village functions such as religious rituals are usually led by other men.)

As in traditional China, the village officials, i.e., the mayor and the village representative, who are now elected, in almost all instances are men of some means (usually large landholders or, most likely, landlords). They usually have many outside contacts through large family networks. Ideally, they are educated and generally respected, and preferably they are men with some local prestige who are willing to use that prestige for the benefit of the village. Again, as will be seen later,

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- 622²¹ Again, as will be seen later
 624 the villagers who fit this description—wealthy, educated, with many
 554 outside contacts through family—have usually been members of the
 565 landlord class.

[602] While in most instances these village officials are among the recognized leaders of the community, there are usually in addition informal, nonelected local leaders who are influential in the village and area. Such informal leaders are very often also wealthy landlords, important in their kinship group, and many times wield a great deal of power from behind the scenes. Informal leaders also may be drawn from the ranks of less wealthy men who, by virtue of their education and perhaps age as well as past displays of community responsibility, have gained the respect of the community.

622 Each village household has a single vote in the selection of any
 624 village official. The job of *lin chang* is relatively insignificant, and
 [592] although a formal election is held, the *lin chang* is usually selected in advance by consensus of the families in the *lin*. But this is not usually the case with the mayor and village representative. Both positions have a rather high prestige in both the village and area, and as a result there may be competition for these offices. If there is competition, it is usually between men who represent the natural cleavages in the village. These
 [602] cleavages for the most part follow kinship lines.

618 Many relationships within the village are greatly affected by kin-
 602 ship. Often, especially during elections or in times of conflict, there tend to be alignments between socially integrated exogamous family groupings on the basis of their relationship through patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence. Because of their demonstrated common descent, such village kinship groupings interact in various activities so that they exert considerable sociopolitical influence in the village and at times, to some minor degree, in the immediate area. While one localized grouping has a population of about one hundred and thirty-five, and another slightly below one hundred, other groupings have fewer people and member families, and also lesser influence in the village. Each of the groupings, however, is similarly organized with a main group head and subheads of smaller descent lines or groupings, and each attempts to compete in village affairs for the benefit of its members. The villagers refer to the above groupings as *tsu* (lineages), even though they are far from being the equivalent in size and organization of the *tsu* described and discussed by Hu (1948) or even Freedman (1958). (This and other such matters on family and kinship organization will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8.) Thus, Hsin Hsing, like so many other villages in Taiwan as well as in Fukien, is a multi-*tsu* village. (Within each village *tsu*, collateral relatives refer to each other as *ch'in tsu*, meaning relatives of the same *tsu*.) But since the *tsu* in Hsin Hsing village are not large in population, all members

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also use appropriate kinship reference terminology for each other.)

THE AGRICULTURAL PROCESS

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However, since the organization, as the official agent in the rural area for the provincial Food Bureau, must perform a number of unpleasant tasks such as the collection of rice and loans, this leads to some distrust of the Farmers' Association by the farmer.

The Farmers' Association has three basic functions. The first, and perhaps the most important, of its functions is its extension services. Many of these are performed with the financial and advisory cooperation of the JCRR. The second function is moneylending, which is of two kinds: loans to farmers by the association itself and loans to farmers by the provincial Food Bureau under the management of the association. The third function is performing, for a fee, some of the work of the provincial Food Bureau. The association sells fertilizer to the farmer and collects (handles and/or stores) rice from the farmer to pay for it. It collects rice for the land tax, for the required rice sale to the government, and for the semiannual payments in kind on land purchased from the government under the Land Reform Program.

Extension Services

The extension services offered by local Farmers' Associations vary a great deal from district to district. Because of the extension services it offers, the association in Pu Yen Hsiang is known to be one of the very best on the island. These services include educational instruction, sponsoring of 4-H Clubs, provision of rental farm implements, providing cash subsidies and loans to members to encourage farm improvements and modernization, and sale to members of such items as seed, bean cake, and bicycles below the market price.

The forms of instruction sponsored by the Pu Yen Hsiang Farmers' Association have been varied and apparently successful. Regular sewing classes are held for the daughters of members, and since the classes are free, many village families wish to take advantage of the opportunity. However, the facilities are so limited that when classes are held, each village may send only a small quota based on the number of association members in the village. In Hsin Hsing large numbers of girls wish to attend the classes, and it is the responsibility of the formal village leaders—the mayor, the village representative, and the village Farmers' Association unit head—to select the students. However, usually the village leaders wish to avoid any possible conflict or criticism over their choices, and, although some girls may meet the qualifications set up by the association better than others, straws are drawn to determine which girls will attend. The method all too often sends less qualified girls to the classes, and these often drop out before the course is over. Several Hsin Hsing villagers have complained of the wastefulness of this method of choice, and claim that the village leaders are refusing to assume their full responsibility.

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ants." The Hsin Hsing villagers readily recall that the local Japanese police and officials showed respect only for the well-to-do landlords. Consequently, if the villagers were to get along successfully with the Japanese, they had to work through their landlords. They usually elected a landlord to handle local village affairs and to represent village interests in dealing with the Japanese authorities.

The arrangement was also to the landlord's advantage. As the official leader, he wielded greater power by which he could more easily manipulate the villagers, and even the tax collector, to his own advantage. His recognition as a leader by his fellow villagers and by the authorities also increased his prestige.

Not only was such a landlord the elected village political leader but he might often be an informal leader as well, a person who took an active part in most of the social and religious affairs of the village. He usually contributed money and time to help make these affairs a success. The efforts of the landlord helped to build up his reputation as a public-spirited citizen. Frequently, he assumed the role of mediator in discussions of village and intervillage problems and in disputes between his own villagers or even between members of other villages. When the landlord's efforts as a mediator extended beyond his own village, he enhanced his own reputation in the whole area and that of his village as well.

These conditions continued after the restoration into the post-land reform period. Today, the landlord class continues in the rural area and wields power in local grass roots politics as well as in socioeconomic affairs. In most villages the recognized leaders are still those who are rich, maintain big landholdings, and have had a fairly good education. Such people may also have influence—perhaps by virtue of a relative—in some government agency. It is still a great advantage to a village to have a wealthy representative of the landlord class to deal successfully with authorities. Many, if not most of the government officials, are drawn from this class, since they are educated and usually wealthy.

However, this picture is beginning to change. Village affairs are being profoundly affected as many former large landlords and traditional local leaders transfer their economic interests and activities away from the land to new business interests elsewhere. When a landlord gives up his major economic interests in the area, it is usually not long before village social, religious, and political activities become much less important to him. Because the personal advantage is gone, he is no longer concerned with maintaining his status or leadership role. He may even move his residence out of the village in order to be closer to his new economic interests.

Villagers suffering such a loss of local leadership have reacted in two

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different ways. The first reaction^A has been apathy—a reluctance to occupy positions of formal village leadership. The other reaction has been for villagers who have more time and money than their fellows and who may aspire to improve their status, to assume formal village leadership.

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The first reaction is best evidenced by a new problem in recent village elections, and especially in the 1958 election. In six of the twenty-two villages in Pu Yen Hsiang, there was no candidate for mayor. According to the district officials, the problem in those six villages was that no one was willing to spend the time and money required of the position. Several villagers pointed out that "The office of village mayor must be filled by a person who is not bound to his fields or other work to support his family. He must have an interest in village affairs and enough money to meet the expenses of the traditional functions of the office. He must be able to entertain any public officials or police visiting the village; he must have enough education and social acumen to carry on successfully the necessary relationships with villagers as well as outsiders with whom he is in frequent contact as village head." However, here it may be noted that the office of mayor no longer requires that an individual have a relatively high degree of education and literacy; village records and paper work are now maintained by a minor official from the district Public Office who acts as village secretary.

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In other villages, the reaction to the withdrawal of landlords from participation in village affairs has been that other people have attempted to fill the position of mayor, who is general village leader. In some villages, men who have the basic qualifications for the office, as well as a sincere interest in working for the village, have gained the respect of their fellow villagers and have been successful as mayor and village head.

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There are also villages—and Hsin Hsing appears to be one of the few in the area—in which the individuals elected to the office of mayor have failed to win respect or acceptance as village leaders. Although they have the qualifications of money and time, and often were the only candidates in the village, their motives are suspect. The man who was mayor of Hsin Hsing during my stay there is perhaps a good example of this. He is a man whom most of the villagers fear but do not respect. They point to his inadequate education—"He knows very few characters!" They say that he has kept more than one wife at a time by taking other men's wives. They feel that he does not really want to work for the village, but only to increase his own power and status. Nevertheless, in spite of all this, he was elected. The main reason he was elected, apparently, is that he has enough time and money to carry out at least the superficial functions of the office, and^A i. e. to the withdrawal of economic interest and leadership in the community by the landlord--Analyst/

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village cleavages worked for his advantage, as did his membership in one of the larger village *tsu* groups with a following that worked hard in the election.

In Hsin Hsing, then, although this man bears the official title of mayor, he is not really accepted as village head. Today, Hsin Hsing village, like many other communities, seems to be virtually leaderless. In Hsin Hsing and in some other villages observed, this has led to a state of civic disorganization in meeting many village problems, especially those concerning relations with other villages. (An example of just such a problem will be discussed in Chapter 6.)

The post-land reform period in the rural area shows signs of being one of social as well as economic transition. Although the landlords still form a definite and important class, the changes taking place may mark the beginning of a decline in the almost exclusive leadership of the landlord or gentry class. There are incipient signs of instability in a traditional social system which had grown out of an unequal distribution of rural wealth and income as a result of the land tenure system. The Land Reform Program which has led many landlords to withdraw their interests from the rural villages appears to be leading to some equalization of social status in rural Taiwan, which may in turn enable new village leaders to become effective.

In the past and, to a lesser degree, in the present, there have been capable villagers who had no opportunity to compete with the landlord class for primary village leadership. Now, perhaps for the first time, these people will have some opportunity to manifest their leadership abilities. But many traditional attitudes must be cleared away before such new leaders can gain widespread acceptance. In addition to actual economic equalization, there must be a more complete equalization of social status in the village. There must be a change in the villagers' own attitudes toward leadership and authority, for they have not yet been emancipated from their respect for wealth and power and the use to which these two can be put in the manipulation of people and politics.

Although the accomplishment of change in this attitude toward leadership and authority is still a long way off, it should be noted that respect for a man is not based entirely on his wealth and power. These qualities in themselves are not enough, but must be accompanied by evidence of responsibility toward the village, active participation in village affairs, and at least an outward appearance of "not looking down on less fortunate fellows."

The consequences of village social disorganization are not fully apparent. However, definite signs of such disorganization were seen in the last chapter in the problems of community organization and co-operation over irrigation, and will be seen in later chapters in the

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problem of village solidarity. It is perhaps too soon to tell how successful these new leaders will be, but it seems likely that if disorganization continues as a result of the gradual withdrawal from leadership by the landlord class, the most capable among the aspirants for village leadership may find, by necessity, increasing acceptance from their fellows.

EFFECT OF LAND REFORM ON THE LAND MARKET

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In the Hsin Hsing area, another effect of the Land Reform Program appears to be a decrease in the free circulation of land, especially in land for rent. Because the 1951 Rent Reduction Act is still in effect, tenants who have contracts are remaining on the land and not giving up their right to tenancy. The landlord can no longer freely change tenants, even when the contract period ends, unless the tenant wishes to give up his rights. At the same time, as the value of rents decline, "the value of leased farm land . . . [is] lower than that of owner cultivated-land" (T'ang, 1954:63). Thus, many landlords do not want to sell their land when its value is low. But even more, under such conditions prospective buyers would gain little from buying land occupied by a tenant who has a contract and a fixed rent.

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Landlords who have been tilling some land themselves will very rarely rent it to anyone now. To do so would mean that the landlord, although receiving his 37.5 percent rent, would have little control over his own land. As a former large landlord put it, "Before the Land Reform the landlord made the rules if he wanted more rent. Today the government makes the rules." If the landlord should find that for some reason he no longer can till the land himself, it is more likely that he will hire laborers to work the land. Formerly, he would probably have rented it out. Thus, there is very little land available today for anyone wishing to rent it.

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There also seems to be little turnover of publicly and privately owned land which was purchased from the government by former tenants under the 1951 and 1953 acts. Only under great financial stress will such villagers give up their rights to assume full ownership at the end of the ten-year amortization period. According to the 1953 act, a farmer who is unable to continue payments on such land may ask the government to repurchase the land for resale to other farmers. "The Government shall in such a case reimburse to the purchaser in one lump sum the purchase price already paid" (T'ang, 1954:191, translation of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, 1953, Chapter IV, Article 29). However, despite the law, when such instances have arisen in the Hsin Hsing area, the land has not been resold through the government but by the farmer directly to another farmer who has approached him for additional land to support a growing family.

FAMILY AND KINSHIP

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ancestral-worship room in the main *tsu* house. (When other *tsu* need special funds for work in the room or for the worship itself, member families are usually taxed.) Whether village family groupings form a large or small *tsu*, or even smaller groups of related families, they do not function as central economic units for their member families. Each family or household is an independent economic unit.

While in many ways these separate economic units do act in unison, such as for exchange labor on the basis of their kin or *tsu* relationships, for the most part their actions as economic units are fairly independent. This means that in many areas of activity the family operates with relatively little regard for their patrilineal kin in other households. Consequently, family economic and social relationships are not limited to patrilineal relatives. As in the single *tsu* village, many Hsin Hsing villagers belong to a number of both formal and informal social associations. However, in Hsin Hsing these activities bring them into regular contact with fellow villagers with whom they have no kinship relationship. Such a diversity of activities with both relatives and nonrelatives in the village does have a tendency to undercut the solidarity of the *tsu* or kinship organizations. In addition, family activities and relationships, both kin and non-kin, also extend beyond the village. (The latter will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters.)

Still, the member families of each Hsin Hsing village *tsu* organization, including some which have no more than sixty to seventy people, do band together in many other village sociopolitical activities. Therefore, when we examine elected offices we see that the village mayor is one of the financially better off and influential members from the large K'ang *tsu*. The village representative to the *hsiang* council is an older "gentleman" from the big Huang *tsu*; he is considered well educated and (on the basis of the three *chia* [7.2 acres] maximum landholding allowed since the land reform) is a fairly large landowner who hires laborers to work his land. The elected agent and head of the village small unit of the district Farmers' Association is an influential member from the large Shen *tsu*. The villagers' choice of one relatively important man from each large *tsu* organization is clearly not a coincidence.⁸ Villagers definitely align themselves on the basis of *tsu* in such situations. Each *tsu* attempts to work for its own socioeconomic and political influence in village affairs, or at times in cooperation with other village *tsu* when that proves more advantageous. This is true in village elections or even in what appears to be occasional *tsu* block voting in district or county elections. According to the villagers, this would occur if one of the *tsu*'s own members is a candidate, but actually occurs more usually when a *tsu* member's *ch'in ch'i* or even friend is a candidate.

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adulthood, often lead to important relationships between two unrelated village families in the economic and social aspects of life. The frequently formed non-kin relationships may also be based upon a common interest in the production and marketing of certain crops, common irrigation problems on land in the same area, or membership in the same water pumping station cooperative. On such bases, then, villagers have the opportunity to make contact with non-kin fellow villagers, and sometimes with people from neighboring villages, and to establish strong friendships and mutual visiting relationships over long periods of time. On the other hand, some villagers who have these relationships in common never develop a real friendship on these bases alone.

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VILLAGE SOLIDARITY

What exist, then, in Hsin Hsing village, and apparently in most of the surrounding villages, are many diversified groupings which cross kin lines. A single family is usually a member of more than one such group. Although the feeling of membership in a *tsu* group is often strongest, the feeling of solidarity with any grouping will vary according to the particular situation. Hsin Hsing is therefore unlike the *tsu* village with its large single *tsu* organization in which relationships are primarily based on kinship, and which may perhaps lend some over-all unity to the many smaller groupings. Hsin Hsing does not have this all-encompassing and overriding kinship organization or feeling of solidarity to provide real unity to the internal diversification.

The village is not entirely lacking in solidarity. There are many occasions, mostly religious or festive, when a basis for village unity does exist. Such events are the birthday of the village god, certain religious processions and *pai-pai* occasions, and often a village marriage or death (all of which will be discussed in detail in Chapters 7 and 8). But feelings of village unity do not necessarily extend to the rendering of substantial assistance to any particular village family or household in need of aid, and in Hsin Hsing the result is a general insecurity and fear by most villagers that in times of personal distress aid may not be forthcoming from within the village.

Because the village has no single uniting thread to minimize natural cleavages, it is often difficult for the many different kinship groupings to cooperate in meeting an unusual problem which may arise for any village family. Many of the villagers would be unwilling to exert themselves, even if the mayor were to ask for help for any one family. If the family in need is opposed to the mayor politically, not in his *tsu* group, or is a smaller individual family with little influence in the

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621 village organization, even the mayor may give only limited help or at
496 best only go through the motions of organizing the entire village to act
• 622 together.

621 An individual family, then, when faced with a crisis situation, can
496 usually expect aid from its own *tsu* or smaller kinship group but not
571 from the entire village. On the other hand, the comparatively smaller
618 kin groups of the village frequently do not have the power of the
larger village *tsu* to give effective aid to an individual faced with
problems. Individuals in such small groups therefore tend to limit
their involvement in the problems of others, and most such families
suffer frequent anxiety and insecurity. In their attempt to ensure some
support from the village when in trouble, they put an extremely high
priority on the maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing* with everyone in the
village. They are always extremely careful of what they say and do for
fear of injuring their village relations. Although no kin relationship
may exist, if one of these families should by chance have the same
surname as one of the village *tsu* groups, it often attempts to identify
itself with that *tsu* group and so derive some of the benefits of mem-
bership in it.

Small individual village families can frequently be observed ingra-
tiating themselves with village *tsu* groups with the hope of maintain-
ing good relations. They are also often known for their extreme cour-
tesy with regard to relations with other villagers. The head of one such
household confided to me in an interview that only by maintaining
especially good *kan-ch'ing* with his fellow villagers could he expect
their aid if he needed it. For this reason, he pointed out, he agrees to
perform many annoying village tasks and generally goes out of his way
to participate actively in village affairs in order to prove his family an
asset to the village.

[829] Within the structure of village relationships, the members of the
larger *tsu* groups often show a fair degree of self-confidence—at least
in their relations with the isolated families or even with families of
small *tsu*. In any village discussions of problems, members of the larger
tsu often suggest that the bothersome tasks be done by someone from
one of the smaller or isolated family groups. The latter, usually after
some mild objection, almost always acquiesce. But this feeling of con-
fidence that the members of the larger *tsu* groups have is unquestion-
ably limited to their relations with the organizationally weaker and
poorer village families. In facing the outside world and the general
problems of life, all the villagers suffer from insecurity and anxiety as
a result of the village's limited sources of solidarity.

628 This is why new relationships made outside the village through
612 marriage with nonrelated families take on added importance. The
villagers naturally value their *ch'in ch'i* relations and, to a much lesser

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affidavits of injury from a notorious doctor in a nearby market town.

Meanwhile, the Hsin Hsing villagers faced problems. They did not have anyone who could help write up the accurately detailed letter of accusation required under Chinese law. When they finally found someone to write the letter, it was submitted through the local police and had to go through a long series of channels before it finally reached the courts.

Several days went by and nothing seemed to happen in the case. When the Hsin Hsing villagers—mainly the few relatives and close friends of Li Fan and his father—went to ask the police what was happening, they were told that such things take time and that it would perhaps be better if they tried to settle the case with the Ta Yu villagers through mediation.

About this time, the Ta Yu villagers who were in the pumping station cooperative and who represented the two assailants made overtures to mediate. The reason they offered was that since both sides were hurt in the fight, they should forget the whole matter instead of pressing further and going to court. To this suggestion there was, of course, no agreement.

The Hsin Hsing villagers were in an awkward position. Although most of them would have liked to help Li Fan and his father win satisfaction and compensation for their injuries and to teach their assailants a lesson, they could do little. One of the main problems was that they had no one who would or could act as their leader. They were an unorganized group, and did not know what to do or how to go about handling the case. This was unlike the men from Ta Yu, who not only had a large powerful pumping station organization to support them, but also had the wealthy and influential village landlord who was a key figure in the cooperative and an influential and powerful man in the area to act in their behalf. Hsin Hsing village no longer has capable and interested village landlords who can lead them in times of trouble. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this may well be a general problem in villages where land reform has at least indirectly caused the downfall in wealth and prestige and especially the community interest of many of the former landlords.

Had Hsin Hsing been a single *tsu* village, Li Fan and his father as part of such a *tsu* might have received more active support from the village as a whole. A *tsu* village's organization and leadership, which grow out of family relationships, would undoubtedly have been much more centrally structured than this small multi-*tsu* village with its highly divisive units. To make the matter even worse, Li Fan and his father are from one of the smallest family groups, which made it all the more difficult for the village to marshal and organize its leadership, since there is no formal organization to handle such matters.

Another problem was that many of the villagers who were at first

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station association, the whole case would be of no avail. They had always held the idea that the poor man without influence could do nothing against the rich and influential. The latter two elements, money and influence, seemed to them to constitute ultimate power. To attempt to do anything against this power was useless. For them even the law was subject to influence by the individuals who hold the power. (This belief was undoubtedly reinforced during the period of Japanese rule, and the present government has done little to remove it.)

At the same time, the villagers felt that since Ta Yu was a neighboring village in which many Hsin Hsing villagers had relatives, if they were to continue to live in peace with Ta Yu and their relatives it was necessary to avoid doing anything which would contribute further to the tensions. After much discussion it became evident that the villagers preferred first to try again to mediate the problem. However, if this did not work out satisfactorily then the case would have to go to court, although they very much doubted that anything could be gained from a court trial.

A few days after the village meeting was held, the Ta Yu side again approached the village—this time through the mayor—asking that they again try to mediate the case. One of the influential men of the area had offered to be mediator at his home in another village about two miles down the road. Mayor K'ang of Hsin Hsing, an educated member of the large Huang *tsu* in Hsin Hsing village, and others of its villagers directly involved in the case attended the mediation meeting.² The mediator was a man who was considered to be biased in favor of Ta Yu, and he displayed his bias in the manner in which he tried to mediate the case. Still, since the role of the mediator is a very respected one, the Hsin Hsing villagers agreed to attend the meeting and stayed throughout the proceedings. They felt that it would have been disrespectful to the mediator to leave too soon and that, in addition, it would cause him to lose face, which was to be avoided. Nothing came of this meeting, since the mediator suggested that the Ta Yu side pay Li Fan and his father only a small amount of money as compensation for their injuries.

After several such futile attempts at mediation, the case was finally called up for investigation in the courts. The court procedure called for the accused and the accusers and their witnesses to appear in a special investigative court somewhat similar to a grand jury. The purpose was to investigate the charges, hear the witnesses, and then decide if the court should indict the accused.

The investigation is highly formalized. Since neither the accused nor the accuser may have their lawyer present, the only document on which the investigators base their inquiry is the original letter of accu-

example bolster the declining role of the village as a source of security and identification. Considering their potential, such men contribute relatively little to their villages.

Coupled with this has been the more recent decline of the traditional landlord leadership as an effect of the Land Reform Program and an ever-increasing vacuum of qualified leadership which has developed in the village. When leadership was sorely needed, as in the Li Fan case for example, the villagers actually turned to me, the alien anthropologist, as a potential source of leadership and help. Many former leaders, now prefer not to become too involved in other people's problems or those of the village. In fact, it is now often difficult for villages to find qualified and respected men even to run for the office of mayor or to assume the responsibilities of a leadership role.

The ever-increasing vacuum of qualified leadership affects not only the operation of the village but that of the *tsu* organizations. One important area of village life adversely affected by the lack of leadership is the apparently increasing inability to resolve local conflict by the traditional method of mediation which was usually carried on by respected *tsu*, village, or area leaders. A particular mediator was selected according to the relationship of the disputants and the nature of the conflict, which might involve intravillage or intervillage disputes over water for irrigation; disputes over landownership and property boundaries; or power struggles between families, especially between *tsu* organizations, over such questions as village administration or the expenditure of funds by village or *tsu* for religious or festive activities; and so on.

Almost always, regardless of the nature of the dispute or the level on which it occurred, mediation had been sought and applied with these aims: first, that the scope and resolution of the conflict be kept localized so as not to invite possible government interference into village affairs, and, second, that the resolution permit the disputants to continue to live harmoniously together. Villagers felt a great degree of permanency since most, tied as they were to the land and to their village, were likewise tied by the particular kinds of relationships developed over the years with local people, both kin and non-kin. There were few opportunities to leave the area, land, or kinship group and go elsewhere so as to avoid the repercussions of an ill-settled dispute.

In recent years, however, it has been becoming increasingly difficult to resolve conflict through mediation and to achieve these aims. In part this is a result of the deterioration of the accepted hierarchal relationship system on both the kin and non-kin levels. On the non-kin level the concept or code of *han-ch'ing* (as discussed in Chapter 6) and the quality of interpersonal relations governed by it have been weakened. The situation developed largely when the traditional land

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The situation developed largely when the traditional land tenure system was modified by Taiwan's Land Reform Program between 1949-1953. An important aspect of the reform was the initiation of a rent reduction and limitation law, but even more important was the introduction of an official contract between landlord and tenant which secured the tenant's rights on the land whatever the relationship, good or bad *kan-ch'ing*, he had with the landlord. The contract for the first time made it clear that the relationship between landlord and tenant and their mutual responsibilities were economic. Once their interaction was limited to an economic relationship as circumscribed by an official contract, it was no longer as important whether either party concerned himself with the traditional maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing*.

Thus, in addition to the already discussed decline of some landlords' socioeconomic and even political interests in the village as a result of the land reform, the deterioration in the basis of *kan-ch'ing*, and with it the prestige of many in the landlord class, has frequently meant that unless landlords who remained in the village had other ways of maintaining their high positions in the community, they lost their usefulness as mediators, being no longer capable of exerting influence and leadership in the community.

On the kinship level, the code which regulated relationships between hierarchal unequals has likewise been affected by change, thus worsening the community's ability to resolve local social conflict. This has occurred on the levels of the *tsu* and even, to some degree, the family. In conflict within the *tsu* or village, as well as beyond the village, the *tsu* organizations through their leaders have always played a role in settling all conflict by mediation. While the several Hsin Hsing *tsu* have never been powerful organizations backed by extremely wealthy members and wealth in corporate land, usually necessary to give them extensive local sociopolitical influence, *tsu* authority has recently been further weakened, as we have seen above, by the extension of the villagers' socioeconomic interests beyond the home area. As a result, even the *tsu* have apparently lost much of their ability to exert sanctions against their own members or their opponents. Thus, as a result of the weakening of the social hierarchy, there has developed a more general inability to use the former traditional respect for particular leaders of the landlord class or *tsu* as a force with which to settle disagreements.

It is not purely a matter of the weakening of the traditional hierarchical relationships between people, however, which has diminished the respect for traditional mediators. This has been intensified by the tendency toward a growing equalitarianism on both the social and economic levels of life among the villagers. The tendency was born of greater educational opportunities, increased election of officials, land

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1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966

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* For a more detailed discussion of attitudes towards the land, see my "Chinese Peasant Values Toward the Land." 000

Chapter 3: Family and Kinship

* Freedman's (1958:2) "inflated families" would apparently be a group of related families oriented around their kinship relationship and in which the activities of the group are aimed primarily at the maintenance of their kinship ties. For such a group, kinship is both the basis of the relationships and also an end in itself. On the other hand, a lineage (*tsu*) uses its kinship relationships as a means to an end: to tie the group members together into an organization so that they might better exert sociopolitical influence to insure their own welfare and security.

* These 99 had a population of 609 persons and included members of village households who were working in Taipei. The figures, from October, 1959, will be used throughout the chapter because they are the most complete tabulations which can be used for a detailed breakdown of the village *tsu* groups and families. The figures used in the demographic section of Chapter 2 for 1958 made it possible to compare Hsin Hsing with the Asiatic and Taiwan as a whole, since the 1959 figures for Pu Yen Hsiang and Taiwan were not available.

The decline in the general population and the number of families in Hsin Hsing which is reflected in the difference between the 1958 and 1959 figures (657 persons living in 115 households in 1958) represents the village's losses through urban migration. As noted in Chapter 4, whole families and members of families had gradually been moving to Taipei; the movement had increased somewhat in the previous two years. Further, many families which had only partially made the move now made it complete, thus changing their residence registration from Hsin Hsing to Taipei.

* It is difficult from this distance to ascertain just how such arrangements were worked out among the village *tsu* organizations. Like so many other ethnographic field studies, much of what is written in this book was analyzed from data only after leaving the field. Since my field research did not focus specifically on such questions as lineage cleavages, my data often are not detailed enough to carry either the description or analyses to their logical conclusions. Therefore, all I can do in such instances is to present and analyze the data as best I can and hope that it may have some value to others.

* Included in the registration of each household unit are such data as the number of people, ages, schooling, occupations, and temporary residences. However, little of this information is kept up-to-date by the local official appointed by the Public Office to act as village secretary. In addition, much of the information recorded is simply not accurate. For example, although many village women and girls engage in full-time local outside employment or perhaps are responsible for tending the family's fields, nevertheless, almost all women are officially recorded as housewives, with no indication of what they actually do.

* These definitions by Lang (1946:14) of nuclear (conjugal) and joint family forms approximate Murdock's definitions (1949:2). The Lang definitions for

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